Eli Lilly's $1.2 billion bid for Ventyx Biosciences represents a starting point that could ultimately lead to an acquisition price 10x higher. Ventyx is now in the same position, except its strategic value is broader, its clinical validation stronger, and the competitive stakes are considerably higher. The
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the American financial system experienced a seismic shift that few saw coming. Regulation Q had capped bank deposit rates at 5.25%, but inflation pushed market interest rates above 15%. Money market mutual funds emerged to fill the gap, offering savers direct access
It is a mistake to evaluate President Trump’s second term through the lens of his first. The economic, fiscal, and geopolitical environment of Trump’s initial presidency was shaped by conditions that no longer apply, such as pandemic-era distortions, emergency fiscal expansion, and a global system temporarily suspended by
The United States consumer market occupies a singular position in the global economy. It is not merely large, but uniquely concentrated, efficient, and profitable in ways that no other market can replicate. Representing nearly 30% of global consumption despite accounting for roughly 4% of the world’s population, the US
For most of modern Chinese history, ultra-processed foods were essentially nonexistent. As late as 1980, before the supermarket boom, foreign fast-food chains, mass snack production, and widespread soft-drink penetration, ultra-processed foods accounted for a negligible share of total caloric intake. The most defensible estimate is well under five percent, and
Biotech markets are accustomed to volatility, clinical risk, and long development timelines. What they are less accustomed to, at least in plain sight, is a strategic mispricing so large that it invites inevitable correction. That is increasingly the case with Ventyx Biosciences. In January 2026, Eli Lilly agreed to acquire
For most investors, the artificial intelligence boom is framed around chips, data centers, and cloud infrastructure. Nvidia, hyperscalers, and power utilities dominate the narrative. Yet beneath the hardware arms race lies a quieter and potentially more consequential economic shift: the monetization of training data itself. For more than a decade,
For years, investors have treated China’s economic problems as contained—serious, but manageable. Slowing growth, an overleveraged property sector, and weak consumer confidence were widely viewed as internal issues, buffered by capital controls, state ownership, and the government’s ability to intervene at scale. That assumption may now be
Structural imbalances do not end market cycles on their own. As Part I outlined, China’s debt system has proven remarkably effective at internalizing losses through repression, rollover, and state control. That capacity explains why the global expansion can persist longer than many expect. But while stress can be stored
Capital markets function best when prices are set by competing buyers and sellers in open, liquid venues. Risk is revealed through volatility, losses are recognized in real time, and capital flows toward its most productive use. When those mechanisms are weakened, or deliberately bypassed, returns can still be generated, but
We have consistently argued that the current market cycle closely mirrors the early 1920s—a post-crisis reset marked by real productivity gains, capital deepening, and the emergence of a transformative general-purpose technology. Just as electrification reshaped the economy a century ago, artificial intelligence is driving durable earnings growth and supporting
The artificial intelligence boom is real. Capital spending is exploding, compute demand is rising at unprecedented rates, and entire industries are reorganizing around machine intelligence. But history suggests a crucial distinction that investors often miss: growth in demand does not guarantee durable profits and the biggest winners are often not