For most of modern Chinese history, ultra-processed foods were essentially nonexistent. As late as 1980, before the supermarket boom, foreign fast-food chains, mass snack production, and widespread soft-drink penetration, ultra-processed foods accounted for a negligible share of total caloric intake. The most defensible estimate is well under five percent, and
Biotech markets are accustomed to volatility, clinical risk, and long development timelines. What they are less accustomed to, at least in plain sight, is a strategic mispricing so large that it invites inevitable correction. That is increasingly the case with Ventyx Biosciences. In January 2026, Eli Lilly agreed to acquire
For most investors, the artificial intelligence boom is framed around chips, data centers, and cloud infrastructure. Nvidia, hyperscalers, and power utilities dominate the narrative. Yet beneath the hardware arms race lies a quieter and potentially more consequential economic shift: the monetization of training data itself. For more than a decade,
For years, investors have treated China’s economic problems as contained—serious, but manageable. Slowing growth, an overleveraged property sector, and weak consumer confidence were widely viewed as internal issues, buffered by capital controls, state ownership, and the government’s ability to intervene at scale. That assumption may now be
Structural imbalances do not end market cycles on their own. As Part I outlined, China’s debt system has proven remarkably effective at internalizing losses through repression, rollover, and state control. That capacity explains why the global expansion can persist longer than many expect. But while stress can be stored
Capital markets function best when prices are set by competing buyers and sellers in open, liquid venues. Risk is revealed through volatility, losses are recognized in real time, and capital flows toward its most productive use. When those mechanisms are weakened, or deliberately bypassed, returns can still be generated, but
We have consistently argued that the current market cycle closely mirrors the early 1920s—a post-crisis reset marked by real productivity gains, capital deepening, and the emergence of a transformative general-purpose technology. Just as electrification reshaped the economy a century ago, artificial intelligence is driving durable earnings growth and supporting
The artificial intelligence boom is real. Capital spending is exploding, compute demand is rising at unprecedented rates, and entire industries are reorganizing around machine intelligence. But history suggests a crucial distinction that investors often miss: growth in demand does not guarantee durable profits and the biggest winners are often not
On December 31, 2025, enhanced ACA subsidies expire by law. When they do, more than 24 million Americans will face premium increases averaging 114%, and an estimated 3 to 5 million people are expected to lose health insurance coverage altogether. Congress knows this deadline is coming—and yet it remains
The United States is nearing a fiscal tipping point. Federal debt now stands at $38.09 trillion. Interest payments have climbed to $970 billion per year and could exceed $1.6 trillion by 2035. Annual deficits remain stuck around $1.8 trillion. These numbers are not abstract; they represent a
For years, the United States has struggled with a structural housing affordability crisis. Prices remain high, mortgage rates remain elevated, and tens of millions of renters remain locked out of homeownership despite being willing, able, and economically essential to the future of the housing market. Traditional policy tools have failed
The industrial pattern that defined the last century is repeating itself, this time in silicon instead of steel. The first phase of the AI boom has been driven by infrastructure: chips, data centers, and the cloud platforms that power them. That phase is now maturing. Valuations for Nvidia, AMD, and